A closed-form solution for quantity and asset-price movements in a dynamic general equilibrium model with non-state-separable preferences shows that the welfare cost of fluctuations and the equity premium can be large in such a model. But a large welfare loss from cycles does not imply a large gain from good monetary policy. Although monetary policy can implement the optimal allocation in a sticky-price version of the model, the gain from such activism is trivial because the optimal allocation continues to imply volatile consumption in response to productivity shocks. This highlights a distinction between recent models and older Keynesian-style models: In recent models, fluctuations are largely an efficient response to shocks and inefficiencies stem from price distortions associated with price rigidity, i.e., Harberger triangles. In the older literature, fluctuations were viewed as inherently inefficient with large costs, i.e., Okun's gaps.
INTRODUCTION
Business cycle research remains very active, despite the provocative suggestion of Lucas (1987) that business cycle fluctuations, at least in the United States, are relatively unimportant for welfare. The size of the welfare losses from fluctuations and the gain from stabilization policy are analyzed below in a dynamic general equilibrium model with consumers who maximize preferences that are state-separable (expected utility) or not separable across states (Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences) .
One conclusion is that the benefit from an activist monetary policy is likely to be trivial in a typical sticky-price business cycle model, even when the welfare loss from fluctuations is arbitrarily large. For example, in the model below the representative consumer would give up a very large share of consumption (greater than 20 percent) in order to eliminate consumption variability for calibrations that match the equity premium and risk-free rate. Nonetheless, the consumer would sacrifice only about 1/10000 th percent of consumption for the benefits from the optimal monetary policy.
1 While this conclusion meshes nicely with the neoclassical tradition behind recent "neo-Monetarist" models (e.g., Prescott (1977) ), it directly contradicts what might be called more traditional (or perhaps old-fashioned) approaches to stabilization policy (Blinder (1987) , Tobin (1994) and Cohen (2000) ) and certainly violates the spirit of early "NewKeynesian" work emphasizing potentially important welfare improvements from stabilization policy (e.g., Ball and Romer (1991) ).
This result arises because fluctuations in the model are primarily driven by exogenous shocks to productivity, as in most of the recent "neo-Monetarist" or "NewKeynesian" literature that embeds sticky prices in dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models. Under these assumptions, fluctuations are primarily -though not exclusivelyan efficient response to shifts in the economic environment, and hence optimal policy only improves welfare slightly. The small gains to optimal policy suggests that the recent surge in work deriving optimal monetary policies in environments similar to that of this paper (following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ) may have misplaced its focus. It may be more fruitful to examine whether quantitative DGE models in which fluctuations are largely inefficient -perhaps because of sunspots or shifts among multiple pareto-ranked equilibria -are plausible characterizations of fluctuations, as the large loss from fluctuations derived below suggest that in such environments the gains to stabilization policy could be quite large. 2 The model provides an analytic characterization of fluctuations in quantities, asset prices, and welfare in a model with preferences that are not separable across states. With 1 It is very important to draw a distinction between the stabilization benefit delivered by monetary policy, and the benefits that arise from different inflationary policies; the latter policies affect steady-state distortions (such as inflation tax effects). This research focuses solely on stabilization, as much recent research has been devoted to finding monetary policy rules to stabilize the economy (e.g., Taylor (1999) ). 2 The gains to an activist monetary policy reflect the limited role aggregate demand management plays in DGE models that have been developed to date. Some research examining the welfare cost of business cycles has emphasized the interaction between aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic consumption risk; in such models, it may be possible for policies that provide insurance against idiosyncratic risk associated with the business cycle to increase welfare, but the link between such insurance policies and stabilization policy, as typically defined, is tenuous and not often developed in the existing literature. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2000) is a recent example.
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Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution need not equal the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. In the model below, quantity fluctuations do not depend on risk aversion, while asset prices and welfare do depend on risk aversion. Therefore, increasing risk aversion does not affect the variance of consumption, but raises greatly the welfare costs of this variance. Tallarini (2000) contains a similar result on risk aversion, showing that quantity fluctuations are almost independent of risk aversion in a similar model. However, the model used therein does not contain an analytical solution, and those presented below complement the numerical exercises in Tallarini (2000) while making a sticky-price model tractable. 3 Section 2 presents the economic environment and the solutions for quantity fluctuations. Section 3 considers the implications of the model for welfare and asset prices. Section 4 introduces a sticky-price version of the model and analyzes the gains from an optimal policy. Section 5 concludes.
THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
The economic environment draws on previous work that presents model economies with explicit analytical solutions. An early example is Long and Plosser (1983) , who show that an analytical solution for economic fluctuations can be found in a model with stateseparable preferences over consumption that are logarithmic if capital depreciates fully after one period. Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) present a generalization of the Long and Plosser model in which capital can last for more than one period, so long as capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs that make next period's capital a CobbDouglas aggregate of today's capital stock and investment level. Benassy (1995) extends this model to a sticky-wage, monetary environment.
The model below is an extension of the Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) and Benassy (1995) model that allows for preferences that are not state-separable (EpsteinZin-Weil preferences) . When the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one, the analytic solution for quantity variables is the same as that implied by the model with expected utility consumers whose intertemporal elasticity of substitution/coefficient of relative risk aversion is one. The results imply that we can solve for an analytical characterization of welfare and asset prices in a dynamic general equilibrium model with capital accumulation even when preferences are not state-separable.
The economic environment can be completely characterized in a flexible-price version of the model by considering the production technology used by firms, the preferences of consumers, and the aggregate resource constraints. The solution of the social planner's problem will yield the optimal allocations of consumption and leisure over time, which also correspond to the flexible price, competitive equilibrium.
A. Production Technology
Firms produce output (Y) with capital (K) and labor input (L). The production function is Cobb-Douglas, and an aggregate productivity shock (Z) shifts the production function over time Aggregate technology has a lognormal distribution; when ρ equals one, (log) aggregate technology is a random walk with non-negative drift g, and, for ρ less than one (in absolute value), aggregate technology is a trend-stationary process.
B. Consumer Preferences
The representative consumer's preferences (U) are defined recursively by
where E{} is the mathematical expectations operator, C represents consumption, and the remaining symbols represent parameters of the utility function. This recursive definition of preferences allows for a separation of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which equals one in equation 2.3) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion as in Epstein and Zin (1989 ,1990 and Weil (1990) . These preferences differ from Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences in including the utility from leisure (which equals the difference between the consumer's time endowment and labor, L-L t ). Tallarini (1996) shows that the coefficient of relative risk aversion over atemporal wealth gambles implied by equation 2.3 is θ θ χ + + 1 . When χ equals one, the recursion in equation 3 collapses to the standard expected utility case, in which the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e., one). When χ dif f e r s fr om one , the re c ur sion in e qua tion 2.3 implie s tha t pr e f e re nc e s a r e not separable across states, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion differs from the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Notably, χ greater than one implies that consumers are more risk averse than under expected utility.
C. Resource Constraints
The resource constraints in the economy are relatively standard. Production equals consumption plus investment, and labor input must be less than or equal to the consumer's time endowment
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When θ equals zero (so there is no disutility from work), equation 2.5 will always bind, while for θ greater than zero, equation 2.5 will never bind. Below, only cases where θ is 3 Kiley: The Benefit from Activist Monetary Policy greater than zero will be considered, as only these cases allow for interesting effects of policy. 4 Capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs. A general specification is that of Lucas and Prescott (1971) , who consider a capital accumulation equation of the form
where J[.] is increasing and concave. The concavity of the installation function J [.] captures the notion of adjustment costs by introducing diminishing returns to the intensity of investment. Following earlier treatments, the depreciation rate (δ) is defined as the level of investment relative to the capital stock (I/K) such that the capital stock is unchanged (i.e., δ equals J -1 [1], using standard notation for an inverse function). In order to obtain closed-form solutions, the following specification is employed 2. 6 1 0 ,
where d is a structural parameter. Adjustment costs are important (i.e., J[.] is strictly concave) and the degree of adjustment costs is determined by the parameter d. (In particular, it will be an implication of the first-order condition for investment that the elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin's Q equals 1/(1-d)). Note that the definition of the depreciation rate combined with 2.6 implies that the specification of capital accumulation assumes full depreciation. A spate of recent work has adopted equation 2.6 because this form delivers closed-form solutions (e.g., Basu (1987) and Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) ) and captures investment adjustment costs, thereby allowing for fluctuations in Tobin's Q (e.g., Abel (2000) ).
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D.
The Closed-Form Solution Generally, the competitive equilibrium cannot be summarized by a closed-form solution and numerical techniques must be used. However, in the current case, the assumptions regarding functional forms yield a solution via what Long and Plosser
. In this case, the production function must be a constant-elasticity of substitution function of capital and labor and preferences must be of the expectedutility, constant-intertemporal-elasticity-of-substitution form, where the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution must be linked to the adjustment cost parameter φ (this result is a trivial reformulation of one in Benhabib and Rustichini (1994) ). These solutions do not allow for non-expected utility and hence cannot plausibly match the equity premium as discussed below.
(1983) term "dumb luck". In this case, dumb luck consists of a method of undetermined coefficients: guess a form of the decision rules for consumption, investment, and labor input, and verify that a solution of this form satisfies all the first-order conditions and constraints. A by-product of this procedure is the decision rules in terms of the underlying parameters governing preferences and technology. Following Long and Plosser (1983) , Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) , and Benassy (1995) , guess that consumption and investment are a constant fraction of output (X = c i Y for some c i , X equal to C or I) and that labor input is constant. Inserting this guess into the first-order conditions for the competitive equilibrium (provided in an appendix), and some algebra yields the solutions
These solutions are exactly those of Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) , who solve the model under expected-utility maximization (i.e., χ equal to one). Since the solutions for investment and consumption are independent of risk aversion, the time path of the capital stock and output are identical (given the capital accumulation equation 2.6 and the production function equation 2.1). Non-expected utility does not alter the business cycle properties of the model at all, regardless of the degree of risk-aversion; the unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution and form of adjustment costs of investment determine the business cycle properties of the model. This result will prove quite useful below in calibrating the model to match asset prices.
Before turning to the welfare cost of business cycles and asset pricing, let's first consider the relationship between these results and other work. As in Long and Plosser (1983) and Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) , the assumptions regarding preferences (that current consumption enters utility logarithmically) and production (Cobb-Douglas production and capital accumulation) generate a constant savings rate and steady labor supply. This reflects the offsetting impacts of income and substitution effects in both decisions. Tallarini (2000) shows that non-expected utility (non-state separable preferences as in this paper) can generate a large equity premium and has only modest implications for the business cycle properties of the model he considers. These results are similar to the finding above that the business cycle properties of the model herein are not affected by separating risk aversion from intertemporal substitution.
One stark advantage of the approach in this paper is the closed-form solutions. These solutions will provide insight into key parameters governing the welfare effects of business cycles and asset prices. More importantly, the closed-form solutions will facilitate the consideration of a monetary policy that attempts to maximize consumers' welfare in the section 4. However, the analytical simplicity comes at a cost: in the model of this paper, (the natural logarithms of) consumption and investment have the same 6 variance -a clearly counterfactual implication. As the primary focus below will be the benefit from activist monetary policy, not a complete characterization of business cycle fluctuations, the simple model is probably a reasonable first step. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , most recent analyses of monetary policy in simple models do not consider investment dynamics at all.
Returning to the model, it is straightforward to insert equation 2.8 into equation 2.6, and use the resulting equation (with equation 2.2) to derive the vector-autoregressive process governing output, capital, and technology
Equations 2.10 through 2.13 show that, conditional on the current capital stock and the current levels of actual and trend productivity (Z and Z * ), all quantities variables are lognormally distributed and homoskedastic. Note that the effects of "trend" and actual productivity have been separated, as these components will play separate roles below. The lognormal distributions of quantity variables will prove useful in deriving both welfare and asset pricing implications of the model.
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE AND ASSET PRICING
The analytic solutions for quantity dynamics implied by the model allow a characterization of welfare and asset prices. These results provide insight into the reasons that previous research has often found a low cost of business cycles (e.g., Lucas (1987) ), and suggest that -if the degree of risk aversion suggested by asset pricing anomalies such as the equity premium is incorporated into the model -the cost of business cycles may be quite large. The presence of a large cost of business cycles then begs the question of whether policies that are optimally chosen can deliver a large welfare gain, which is addressed in section 4.
A. The Welfare Cost of Business Cycles
The model implies that consumption is lognormally distributed, with the period t mean of log consumption linked to the current values of capital and productivity through equations 2.7 and 2.10. Current utility -equation 2.3 -depends on log consumption, leisure, and the log of the expectation of a nonlinear function of future utility. This nonlinearity makes preferences non-state separable, and divorces the coefficient of relative risk aversion from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. One might imagine that these complications make it difficult to analytically solve for utility, and hence analytically compute the welfare cost of business cycles. In fact, the closed-form solution of utility is straightforward to derive. As before, employ a variant of the method of undetermined coefficients. Specifically, assume that utility is normally distributed, and that the mean of utility depends upon the same factors that determine the mean of log consumption (a constant, capital, trend productivity, and the deviation from trend productivity). These assumptions, combined with equations 2.1, 2.7, and 2.10 and a little algebra yield 6
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It is straightforward to use equation 3.1 for the typical welfare cost of business cycle calculations that have often been performed following Lucas (1987) .
These types of calculations typically ask the question: 1. How much would a consumer be willing to pay, in units of consumption, in order to eliminate all variability in the consumption stream? In the model, this can be achieved by setting the variance of the productivity shock equal to zero. Equation 2.1 implies that the change in utility from a given change in the variance of productivity (∆U|∆σ 2 ), with the appropriate adjustment to Z t /Z * t to leave its mean unchanged -i.e. exp(-½∆σ 2 ), is
The second term reflects the Jensen's inequality adjustment to the mean of productivity, given the specification of productivity fluctuations as lognormal.
The central result concerns the magnitude of the utility cost of fluctuations: while risk aversion has no effect on the quantity dynamics of the model, equation 3.2 makes very clear that a high degree of risk aversion (a high value of χ) implies a very large effect of fluctuations on welfare.
7 To compute this cost in terms of percentage declines in 6 The following property of normally distributed random variables is also needed: if x is normally distributed with mean m and variance s, then E{e x } = e m+0.5s
. 7 Remember that the coefficient of relative risk aversion over atemporal wealth gambles is 
the level consumption that a consumer would be willing to pay (∆U|(∆lnC)), consider the change in utility from a permanent percentage decline in consumption from equation 2.3
Notice that the change in utility implied by a percentage change in the level of consumption is independent of risk aversion. In an expected utility model, the utility cost of a percentage decline in the level of productivity would depend on the coefficient of relative risk aversion/intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Such dependence reflects the effects of intertemporal substitution, not risk aversion, which is intuitive because the change does not involve risk. The separation of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution -and the analytical characterization of fluctuations and welfare -makes this result very clear. A computation of the tradeoffs the consumer would be willing to make to remove the variability of productivity is simple given equations 3.2 and 3.3: for a given decline in the variance of productivity innovations, find the decline in consumption that equates equations 3.2 and 3.3. Table 1 presents such comparisons for two representative calibrations of the stochastic process for productivity -a unit root process and a trend stationary process -that are chosen to match roughly the stochastic process of consumption. Other parameter values are chosen sensibly, as discussed in the footnote to the table.
Panel A reports the results for the random walk productivity process. Column 1 reports the coefficient of relative risk aversion, column 2 reports the loss in welfare from volatility (which is derived by setting the variance of productivity innovations to zero), and column 3 presents the gain in utility from a one percent increase in consumption. Column 4 presents the loss in the level of consumption that a consumer would accept to eliminate volatility, in percentage points (log-difference). For levels of risk aversion above 25, these figures are large (for example, exceeding twenty percentage points for a coefficient of relative risk aversion near 50), reflecting consumers distaste for fluctuations. The welfare costs of business cycles in the model can be several orders of magnitude larger than suggested by Lucas (1987) , who places the cost of consumption fluctuations at less than a tenth of a percent of consumption. The figures for a trendstationary process (panel B) are also large, for very high degrees of risk aversion. Tallarini (2000) first notes similar findings. The discount factor (β) equals 0.9724, the depreciation parameter (d) equals 0.10, and the capital income share (a) equals 0.33. The weight of leisure in utility (θ) equals 3. The growth rate of trend productivity (g) is chosen so that income and consumption grow at 3.2989 percent per year. In the random walk case, the innovation to consumption growth has a variance of 0.000144; in the trend stationary case, ρ equals 0.920698, and the innovation has a variance of 0.000133. These parameterizations match the random walk and trend-stationary processes for nondurables and services consumption (chain weighted, 1996 dollars) over the 1955-1999 period (annual frequency).
These results raise the question of whether the high degrees of risk aversion associated with a large cost to business cycles are reasonable. The answer to this question cannot be found by considering quantity dynamics, as such dynamics are independent of risk aversion. This result is important, as economists view high degrees of risk aversion as implausible at least in part because in some models high risk aversion leads to very smooth consumption dynamics. For example, Lucas (1987) rejects high degrees of risk aversion as implausible, in part because such high degrees of risk aversion would lead to consumption smoothing under the expected-utility preferences he uses.
8 To illustrate the "plausibility" of high degrees of risk aversion in the model developed herein, the next sub-section asks what degree of risk aversion is necessary to match the equity premium in the model.
B. Asset Pricing
Non-state separable preferences (Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences) were first applied to asset pricing issues, as a perusal of the references makes clear. The analytical characterization of quantity and utility dynamics suggests that it may be fruitful to consider the asset pricing implications of the model in order to inspect the mechanisms at work, as well as to gauge plausible degrees of risk aversion for the welfare calculations above. The normal distributions of utility and the logs of all quantities make such derivations straightforward.
Following standard practice (e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) , Cochrane (2000) ), assets can be priced with knowledge of a pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor M. Specifically, the return to an asset j is determined by the following equation
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where R t+1 j is the return on asset j between period t and period t+1. The stochastic discount factor M is given by the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in period t+1 to the marginal utility of consumption in period t
5
. In the expected utility case (χ equal to 1), equation 3.5 simplifies to the familiar logutility case, where the stochastic discount factor is the discounted inverse of consumption growth.
Returns on different assets can be derived by using equations 3.4 and 3.5 in conjunction with the stochastic processes governing consumption (and hence utility) discussed in section 2. The appendix discusses the derivation of the risk-free interest rate and the return to equity. The risk-free rate is given by
Higher degrees of risk aversion (i.e., higher values of χ) lead to lower values of the riskfree rate, as risk-averse consumers value the safety of sure claims to future consumption.
The expected return to equity is given by
The equity premium -the log-difference between the return to equity and the risk-free rate -follows directly from equations 3.6 and 3.7
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). 1 The equity premium is an increasing function of risk aversion; interestingly, as a comparison of equations 3.6 and 3.7 illustrates, the larger risk premium associated with higher levels of risk aversion stems from a lower value of the risk-free rate, not higher values of the return to equity. This follows from the production structure of the model: in a model with production, the return to equity is pinned down by the propensity to save and the production technology (as these two factors pin down the marginal product of capital).
To illustrate the types of equity premia that can be delivered by the model, table 2 presents the equity premium implied by the productivity processes (both trend stationary and random walk) from table 1. The values of the risk-free rate and return to equity are presented for balanced growth levels of productivity and capital (Z t =Z t * , K t+1 /K t =exp(g/(1-a))). The last row of the table reports the risk-free rate and the return to equity in the data; the equity premium is about 4-1/4 percent historically. In the random walk case (panel A), an equity premium close to that observed in the data can be reached with a high degree of risk aversion -a coefficient of relative risk aversion around 200. This is a high degree of risk aversion, and lies well outside the "reasonable" range posited by Mehra and Prescott (1985) . It is notable that in the business cycle model herein such a high degree of risk aversion has no effect on quantity fluctuations, because the coefficient of relative risk aversion is not linked to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. To the extent that a high degree of risk aversion is considered implausible because such a high degree of risk aversion would lead to a strong consumption smoothing motive (as in Rouwenhorst (1995) or Jermann (1998) ), the model clearly shows that this is not the case with state-separable preferences. In any event, most explanations of the equity premium require high degrees of risk aversion (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) , Cochrane (2000) ). Moreover, by separating intertemporal substitution and risk aversion, the model herein does not encounter any problems matching both the equity premium and the riskfree rate for plausible discount factors (a problem common to other models (Weil (1989) , Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) ). The degrees of risk aversion consistent with a large equity premium are about four times as large if the productivity process is assumed to be stationary, as in this case consumers face substantially less consumption risk (panel B). One common thread across both the random walk and trend stationary cases regards the welfare costs of business cycles. If risk aversion is chosen to deliver an equity premium near the data, the welfare costs of business cycles in table 1 are large -several orders of magnitude above the suggestion of Lucas (1987) . This suggests that, at least within the model, it is reasonable to consider high risk aversion. Alvarez and Jermann (2002) also argue that asset prices provide reason to assume high risk aversion when computing welfare costs.
THE BENEFIT FROM AN ACTIVIST MONETARY POLICY
While the welfare results above show that business cycles may be very costly, they provide no insight into the benefit from stabilization policies. This result is immediate in the model already presented, as the allocation that characterizes the competitive equilibrium with no distortions is pareto optimal. The calculations above illustrate that consumers may dislike the fluctuations associated with stochastic productivity a great deal, but no policymaker can improve consumer welfare, as the fluctuations in output and consumption stem from nature's stochastic productivity process.
In order to consider a role for policy, let's suppose that firms' output prices are sticky. If nominal prices are fixed in advance of productivity shocks and firms commit to meeting demand at those fixed prices, the real wage will no longer equal the marginal product of labor and fluctuations will no longer be optimal. Recent research has emphasized these distortions in calculating the welfare losses associated with fluctuations in models where consumers maximize expected utility (following the influential contribution of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ).
To introduce a role for money, assume that output is proportional to real money balances
4.1
where M is the nominal money supply and P is the nominal price level. While the introduction of a quantity equation like equation 4.1 may appear ad hoc, it is straightforward to introduce a similar equation by assuming that real balances enter the utility function.
9 Importantly, the role of real balances in the utility function is ignored in the welfare calculations below. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) suggest that such a decision is appropriate when analyzing policy; the Friedman-rule prescriptions that fall out of typical "microfoundations" that introduce money are not followed in practice by central banks, suggesting that the role of real balances in welfare -outside of the stabilization possibilities introduced by fiat money -may be small. In any event, recent research has ignored these effects, and this study will follow the same procedure.
Sticky nominal prices are introduced in the simplest way that preserves the analytical solutions for output and price fluctuations. Specifically, assume that firms set (log) prices prior to the productivity realization so that the expected (log) level of real balances are proportional to the expected (log) level of output as in the aggregate demand constraint:
9 Suppose, as in, for example, Benassy (1995) , that the utility function in equation 3 is replaced by
where M/P are real balances. In addition, the budget constraint facing the consumer is modified to include real balances. It is straightforward to show, as in Benassy (1995) , that these preferences give rise to a money demand function of the form in equation 4.1. The effect of real balances on utility is ignored in the calculations in the text, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and other research.
4.2
, ln } ln {ln ln
where Y t is the equilibrium level of output. This pricing rule is standard when firms' preset prices; it is a first-order Taylor series approximation to the optimal rule (e.g., Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2003) ).
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Combining the price level equation 4.2 and the aggregate demand relationship given by equation 4.1 with the production function yields (via the method of undetermined coefficients) the processes for output and labor input:
Two important aspects of equations 4.3 and 4.4 are immediate: 1. Labor supply will fluctuate in response to unexpected movements in productivity and money, and such fluctuations are inefficient (as labor supply is constant under the optimal allocation); 2. The monetary authority can implement the optimal allocation by setting the innovation in the money supply equal to the innovation in productivity, which offsets the aggregate demand constraint. Also, it is straightforward to show that, conditional on the path of output, the processes for consumption and investment (equations 2.7 and 2.8) are the same in the sticky-price model. Since monetary policy can implement the optimal allocation, it could be that the benefit to the representative consumer from such action is substantial. To consider that possibility, one must first define what an alternative monetary policy would be. Suppose the alternative is a deterministic monetary policy in which the money supply grows at some constant rate -and hence does not respond to any exogenous shock.
11 In this case, labor input will fall in response to a positive productivity innovation, and output will remain constant (equations 4.3 and 4.4) until the period following the shock. It is clear that labor input has a higher variance under the sub-optimal policy than it does under an optimal policy; in this sense, the activist monetary policy pursues a stabilization goal, consistent with conventional usage (i.e., the dual mandate of the Federal Reserve is price stability and full employment). However, the variance of output is smaller (for ρ less than one) or unchanged (for ρ equal to one) under the sub-optimal policy than it is under the optimal policy. (For the reader interested in the mathematics, a comparison of equation 4.3 with a deterministic money supply and equation 2.10 reveals that the variance of output under the sub-optimal policy is ρ 2 times the variance under the optimal policy). The result regarding output variances is not uncommon in the class of models considered: for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) find that an optimal monetary policy 10 With prices preset one period in advance, the first-order condition for the optimal price would be the product of the stochastic discount factor and the expression determining the optimal markup over marginal cost; as the stochastic discount factor enters multiplicatively, it does not appear in the first-order terms of the Taylor-series expansion. At this point, the reader may object that sticky nominal prices are normally motivated with imperfect competition. It is trivial to extend the model to include monopolistic competition in the traditional manner (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ); so long as fiscal policy is set to remove the distortionary effects of monopolistic competition (as is traditionally done in welfare analyses), none of the discussion herein is altered. 11 Note that the choice of the growth rate of the money supply that is optimal will be determined by the microeconomics behind equation 4.1, which are ignored.
would have led to a much more volatile stream of output in the United States than actually occurred. The optimal policy is termed a stabilization policy herein, despite the fact that some may object to the term stabilization policy because it focuses on employment and does not apply to output in the present case.
A closed-form expression for welfare cannot be found under the sub-optimal policy because utility depends upon leisure, which equals the difference between the labor endowment and labor supply and is not lognormally distributed (even though labor supply is log-normally distributed). Therefore, consider an approximate solution, where the disutility from labor supply is approximated by
.5 is a first-order Taylor-series approximation of the disutility of labor supply around the expected level of labor supply. The log deviation is used, rather than the level deviation, as then utility will be (approximately) normally distributed. Also, the last term in the approximation is the expectation of the second-order terms in a Taylor-series approximation; including these expectations improves the average accuracy of the approximation, while preserving the normal distribution of utility.
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Given equation 4.5, proceed as in section 3: assume that utility is normally distributed, and that the mean of utility depends upon the same factors that determine the mean of log consumption, yielding (with a deterministic path for the money supply) This expression is very similar to equation 3.1. The differences lie in the effect of the innovation (u 5 ) and the additional term in the intercept involving the variance, and both of these differences clearly arise because of variable labor supply.
However, these equations can be simplified. A sticky price level does not alter the equality between the marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and the real wage:
On average (i.e., at L t equal to the optimal labor supply), the real wage equals the marginal product of labor; combining this with equation 2.8 for consumption yields
Inserting this equality into the equation for u 5 shows that u 5 equals u 4 , and hence the only difference between utility under the deterministic monetary policy and the optimal monetary policy (the difference between equation 3.1 and equation 4.6) is 4.8
Finally, dividing this loss from an absence of activist policy by the loss from a percentage point reduction in consumption in equation 3.3 to provide a measure of the potential gains from stabilization policy yields
This stabilization benefit is likely to be very small, as the discount factor lies near one. The trivial gain implied by the factor (1-β) in equation 4.9 arises because optimal policy only removes the distortion that arises over the period of price stickiness; if this period is only a year or so, medium-run fluctuations faced by the consumer are not much affected by monetary policy.
Moreover, this benefit of optimal policy does not depend on risk aversion, so the high values of risk aversion necessary to match asset market data do not yield a large benefit to activist policy. This result is intuitive: good policy, in an environment where sticky-prices are the primary distortion, only serves to recreate the optimal allocation, which still includes the risk delivered by a stochastic productivity environment. Without an activist policy, this risk affects both labor supply and consumption fluctuations, which causes inefficient movements through time in labor input and consumption. However, the overall amount of risk faced by consumers is not affected by optimal policy. In mathematical terms, sticky prices -by altering the response of real wages to productivity shocks -shift some risk from consumption to leisure, but optimal decision-making by households on the consumption/leisure margin (equation 4.7) implies that this redistribution of risk depends upon intertemporal substitution rather than risk aversion. Since the size of this distortion is only as large as the "Harberger triangle" that measures the deviation of the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption from the (negative of) the marginal product of labor, the welfare costs of fluctuations is likely to be small. In particular, an increase in labor input lowers welfare directly, but also results in higher output and consumption. The increase in consumption increases welfare. The overall effect is to lower welfare, reflecting the inefficient mix between consumption and leisure -which stems from the gap induced by sticky prices between the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and the (negative of) the marginal product of labor.
To gauge the quantitative magnitude of the gain from activist policy, consider the gains that are implied by the random walk and stationary productivity processes used in table 1. According to these processes (and finding the change in productivity that sets equation 4.9 to one), consumers under the random walk process would give up less than 0.00012 percent of the level of productivity for the optimal monetary policy. Consumers facing the stationary productivity process would give up about 0.00011 percent of the level of productivity for the optimal monetary policy. These gains are many orders of magnitude smaller than those in table 1; monetary policy can eliminate only a fraction of business cycle risk in the model of this paper. In fact, these gains are orders of magnitude smaller than the welfare costs of business cycles in Lucas (1987) .
Should the trivial benefits associated with activist policy in this paper be taken seriously? From one perspective, the answer is yes. A large body of recent work has pursued models in which rigid prices are the primary distortion and fluctuations are driven by the standard shocks of dynamic general equilibrium models, i.e., productivity shocks and government spending shocks.
13 A growing literature examines the welfare losses in such models (following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ); unlike in this paper, this work does not consider the absolute level of the gains from good policy, but rather considers the relative gains of certain policies. While the types of price rigidities modeled in this recent work are often more complicated than the price rigidity mentioned above, broadly speaking the models are similar. Hence, the welfare calculations in this paper show that optimal policies in such work are likely to have trivial benefits -even if one accepts the very large distaste for fluctuations that consumers may have if risk aversion is sufficiently high, as in section 3. In old-fashioned terms, monetary policy in the recent literature focuses on eliminating the Harberger triangles that arise from nominal price stickiness -and Harberger triangles are small relative to Okun's gaps (Tobin (1987) ).
The analysis also makes clear what modifications to the model would substantially raise the benefit from good monetary policy. For example, if poor monetary policy choices had historically raised the amount of risk in the economy -for example, by behaving erratically and creating output and employment fluctuations through monetary surprises in equations 4.3 and 4.4, the elimination of this poor behavior would raise welfare substantially with highly risk-averse agents. While few observers would suggest that such shocks have been the major contributor to US business cycles in recent decades, some research has suggested that a poorer understanding of the forces influencing the business cycle in the past contributed to economic volatility at some times (e.g., in the 1970s (Orphanides (2002) ). It should also be apparent that many other types of macroeconomic shocks that have at times been important -such as changes in government spending and tax policies or shifts in preferences regarding labor supplylead to important fluctuations in dynamic general equilibrium models with flexible prices. The improvement in welfare from good monetary policy in sticky-price environments subject to such shocks will again operate through equilibration of the consumption/leisure tradeoff with the marginal product of labor as in equation 4.7, and this margin leaves little room for large effects of policy on welfare in stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models as currently constructed.
Another factor that could create a larger role for policy would be a significant role for inefficient shocks as sources of business cycles. Traditional Keynesian analysis often argued that fluctuations were a pathological response to shifts in animal spirits or other factors that would not yield fluctuations under an optimal allocation. Under this view, the welfare gains from stabilization policy could be on the order of magnitude of the costs of fluctuations in section 3 -because much of monetary policy would be responding to Okun's gaps. However, little progress has been made in developing quantitative business cycle models based on microfoundations in which fluctuations are primarily an inefficient response to animal spirits or the result of shifts between multiple but paretoranked equilibria (beyond the illustrative work following Farmer (1993) , which largely ignores stabilization policy). After such models have been constructed, it will also be necessary to show how well designed monetary policies may limit such sources of risk in order to demonstrate large improvements in welfare from such actions.
SUMMARY
The model of this paper describes an economy subject to productivity fluctuations that possesses an analytical solution for quantity and asset price movements when consumers' preferences are not state-separable (the non-expected utility preferences of Epstein-ZinWeil) . While the assumptions on functional form required to deliver analytical solutions are special, several results emerge clearly. First, it is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution that is critical for quantity fluctuations following shocks, not risk aversion. In addition, the welfare costs of fluctuations are very large when the model is calibrated to match the equity premium, because a large equity premium reflects a distaste for risk and the consumption risk faced by consumers is substantial. Both of these results can also be found in Tallarini (2000) , but the numerical techniques may hinder interpretation and the analytical results herein should help facilitate future work.
More importantly, the characterization of fluctuations also allowed consideration of a sticky-price version of the model, which provides a role for an active monetary policy. Monetary policy can improve welfare by offsetting the effects of sticky prices on labor and output fluctuations. While monetary policy can be very effective in this regard (and in fact can implement the optimal policy in the model), the benefit to such an activist policy is trivial. The small gain arises from the limited potential role of policy: most fluctuations reflect the (efficient) movements induced by fluctuations in productivity. In fact, the benefit of optimal policy is independent of risk aversion in the model, so even calibrated versions of the model in which consumers dislike fluctuations to an arbitrarily large degree yield trivial benefits from good activist policies.
The emphasis on the role of policy -rather than simply the welfare costs of fluctuations -is a step beyond the work of Lucas (1987) and others in illustrating that a large cost of fluctuations need not imply a large benefit to stabilization policy. A large and growing literature uses sticky-price models that are broadly similar to the model in this paper to address questions regarding optimal monetary policy design. Since the gains to optimal policies are so small, this literature's focus is basically unimportant given the framework used. This result is clear upon reflection: optimal monetary policy in NewKeynesian models like that of this paper is solving a taxation problem (i.e., removing the distortion arising from sticky prices), and hence the gain from optimal monetary policy can only be as large as the appropriate Harberger triangle. And the profession has known for a long time that it takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun's gap.
14 Perhaps research that questions the assumption that the fluctuations in the economy represent a response to productivity or other exogenous shocks, and pursues the notion that fluctuations are inefficient response to sunspot shocks or shifts between pareto-ranked equilibria (and hence allows Okun's gaps), could find a larger role for stabilization policy. This question is ripe for further research. . Equation A 4 relates the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to the marginal rate of transformation between leisure and consumption (i.e., the negative of the marginal product of labor) -i.e., the intratemporal condition for optimality. Equation A 3 (in combination with equation A 2) equates the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption to the return to postponed consumption (which involves both the marginal product of capital in production and the marginal product of investment in capital accumulation) -i.e., the intertemporal condition for optimality.
Generally, the set of nonlinear equations that characterize the optimal allocation (equations 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, A 1, A 2, A 3, and A 4) do not possess a closed-form solution. However, in the current case, the assumptions regarding functional forms yield a solution via what Long and Plosser (1983) term "dumb luck". In this case, dumb luck consists of a method of undetermined coefficients: guess a form of the decision rules for consumption, investment, and labor input, and verify that a solution of this form satisfies all the first-order conditions and constraints. A by-product of this procedure is the decision rules in terms of the underlying parameters governing preferences and technology. It is straightforward to verify that the solutions in the text satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
Deriving closed-form solutions for asset prices
Rearranging equation 3.4 shows that the risk-free rate equals the inverse of the expected value of the stochastic discount factor: 
M E R
Substituting the expression for the stochastic discount factor (equation 3.5) and the laws of motion for consumption and utility (and using standard results regarding expectations of variables with normal distributions) yields the risk-free rate: The return to equity -defined as the return to a claim to capital -can also be easily derived. Consider a decentralized version of the model in which firms undertake investment, and issue shares to finance this investment. For simplicity, there is one share that is traded as a claim to the economy's capital stock, with value V t at the end of period t (following the payment of dividends, so V t is the ex-dividend price of the share). The return to an investment in this share is (V t+1 + D t+1 )/V t , where D represents the dividend payment (which in turn equals the firm's revenue minus wage payments and investment, Y-WL-I). Using standard arguments, the value of the share will equal the value of the capital stock in terms of consumption; the only complication is that, while the price of investment in terms of consumption is one, the capital adjustment costs implied by equation 2.6 imply that the price of capital in terms of consumption will differ from one. Denoting the price of capital in terms of consumption by q * , and using the unit relative price of investment, yields the following equation for q * A 7 . ) 1 ( } { 
